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Abstract
The standoff between Russia and the West over Ukraine has already obstructed cooperation 
across a range of issues. Could it also affect state interaction between Norway and Russia in the 
Arctic—an area and a relationship long characterized by a culture of compromise and/or coop-
eration? Here we start from the theoretical premise that states are not pre-constituted political 
entities, but are constantly in the making. How Russia views its own role and how it views other 
actors in the Arctic changes over time, calling for differing approaches. That holds true for Nor-
way as well. To clarify the premises for interaction between Russia and Norway in the Arctic, we 
scrutinize changes in official discourse on Self and Other in the Arctic on both sides in the period 
2012 to 2016, to establish what kind of policy mode—“realist,” “institutionalist,” or “diplomatic 
management”—has underlain the two countries’ official discourse in that period. Has Norway 
continued to pursue “balancing” policies undertaken in the realist mode with those in the diplo-
matic management mode? Which modes have characterized Russia’s approach toward Norway? 
Finding that realist-mode policies increasingly dominate on both sides, in the conclusion we dis-
cuss how the changing mode of the one state affects that of the other, and why a New Cold War is 
now spreading to the Arctic.
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1. Introduction
Since the Ukraine crisis erupted in 2014, Russian–Western relations have plummeted 
dramatically. Despite the different historical setting, there are striking similarities to 
the Cold War, one being that the globally interlinked nature of that conflict meant 
that “trouble in one area metastasized to others.”1 The standoff over Ukraine has 
already obstructed cooperation across various issues. Could it also affect state inter-
action between two countries in the Arctic—a region that has in recent decades been 
defined primarily by a culture of compromise2 or a spirit of cooperation?3 This article 
examines changes in the premises of Norwegian and Russian state interaction in the 
Arctic: how official views and narratives have changed before and after the crises 
in Ukraine, 2012–2016.4 What kind of policy mode—“realist,” “institutionalist,” or 
“diplomatic management” (see introduction to this thematic cluster)—characterizes 
Norwegian and Russian official discourse? How have changes in policy mode affected 
interaction between these two Arctic states?
Even during the Cold War, with security concerns in focus, a culture of compro-
mise was achieved by balancing policies undertaken in the realist mode with those 
pursued in the diplomatic management mode. Seeking to understand the premises 
for interaction between Norway and Russia in the Arctic, we ask whether Norway has 
kept this balance in the period 2012–2016—and which modes characterize Russia’s 
approach toward Norway during the same period. We conclude with a discussion of 
how the changing policy modes of the one state have affected changes in the other.
The article offers two contributions: to the current public debate, and to the aca-
demic debate on Russian–Western relations. First, we challenge the widespread 
assumption that states have unchanging, set modes of foreign policy: that Western 
states are necessarily “cooperative,” whereas Russia, reverting to its “true self,” is nec-
essarily “assertive.” Second, emphasizing how the character of relations is determined 
not solely by the foreign policy of one state, but by the combination of the foreign 
policies of several states, this article expands the academic literature on Russian– 
Western relations in the Arctic and beyond in the wake of the Ukraine crisis. A more 
nuanced understanding of Arctic interactions between Norway and Russia can help 
to explain the extent to which—and how—the crisis in Russian–Western relations is 
“contaminating” the Arctic.
We study Norway’s changing approach to Russia in particular detail, for several 
reasons. First, this article is part of a thematic cluster where other contributions cover 
various aspects of Russian policies in the Arctic in depth. Here, we aim to show how 
the policies of even a small state like Norway can interact with and play into the poli- 
cies of Russia in the Arctic. Second, Norwegian government officials are far more 
preoccupied with Russia than Russia is with Norway, and thus talk about Russia 
to a much greater degree. This reflects the core identities of these two states, their 
representations of Self and Other, and the status of the Arctic in official national 
discourses. We have selected the period 2012–2016—two years before and two years 
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into the crises in Ukraine—to capture the consequences of these landmark events in 
a totally different theatre: the Arctic.
We begin by presenting our understanding of states and foreign policies, as well 
as our sources and how we apply them to address our research questions. Drawing 
on secondary sources, in section 3 we offer a brief historical survey of the types of 
policy modes used by Norway and Russia in the Arctic. Sections 4 and 5 present our 
analyses of Norwegian and Russian official texts. These sections show the changing 
narratives of Self and Other in the Arctic and discuss the policy modes involved. In 
the concluding section, we note that the new Russia–West conflict, exacerbated by 
the 2014 crises in Ukraine, has already contaminated interaction in the Arctic; and, 
with reference to the combination of changing Self/Other representations and policy 
modes on both sides, we indicate how this came about.
2. Theory, methodology and analysis of texts
We view states not as pre-constituted political entities, but as constantly in the mak-
ing.5 State identities are deeply relational and continuously reproduced through 
social interaction.6 Admittedly, the relative consistency of state identities can be 
remarkable.7 Russia, for example, has a “great power” identity: it often views and 
acts in the world by projecting power and seeing any gain for other states as a loss for 
itself. But Russian identity is not constant, nor is Russia’s foreign policy practice.8 
Norway is a small state with a foreign policy identity that often makes it inclined to 
support international legal regimes, multilateral institutionalism, cooperation, and 
compromise.9 But also Norway changes, and realist policies are not unheard-of. 
Such changes may occur in response to an assertive Russia, or to pressure from 
an assertive ally, or because Norway is re-defined from within. Whatever it is that 
triggers the change in a state’s identity articulations, we assume that such narra-
tives of Self and Other lay out logical paths for policies and inform the policy mode 
involved.10 Political statements cannot be dismissed as mere “rhetoric”: they shape 
policies and patterns of state interaction in fundamental ways. 
This study builds on in-depth, systematic scrutiny of official statements and doc-
uments. The Norwegian data are statements, press releases, speeches etc. from the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), the Prime Minister’s Office, and the Ministry 
of Defense (MoD). The Russian data are transcripts and statements from the Rus-
sian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (including the Minister’s and Deputy Ministers’ 
public appearances, transcripts from press briefings, “answers to the press,” and 
official statements and “comments”), transcripts from the public appearances of 
the President, and news documents from the Ministry of Defense. The texts have 
been “scraped”—downloaded in full—from www.regjeringen.no and www.mid.ru, 
www.kremlin.ru, and www.mil.ru, respectively, and organized in a readily search-
able table with full text of each document together with metadata (date, type of 
document, etc.).
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We then narrowed down our text collection to documents that include references 
to both Russia and the Arctic on the Norwegian side, and documents that include 
references to Norway or the Arctic on the Russian side—the difference being due 
to the far higher number of documents on the Norwegian side.11 We hold that the 
resulting text collection allows us to trace salient trends in the official discourse on 
both sides in the period under study. 
Having the text selection available in such an organized manner significantly eased 
the process of data management. Further, having complete text collections from 
which to select the subset allowed us to contextualize the attention given to the sub-
ject in official discourse over time.
The bar charts in Figure 1 show the frequency of mentions of the Arctic and 
Russia(n) in Norwegian official discourse for the period 2012–2016, measured as 
number of mentions per 100,000 words in the documents of the three ministries.12 
Two additional measurements are included below the bars for each year: the per-
centage of documents in which the terms are mentioned, and the total number of 
mentions per year. Figure 2 displays the corresponding frequency of mentions of 
Norway and the Arctic in Russian official discourse.13
While Figure 1 and Figure 2 are not directly comparable (due, inter alia, to differ-
ing press and information policies), they show that Norway talks much more about 
Russia than Russia talks about Norway, and indicate trends within the different 
Figure 1. “The Arctic” and “Russia” in Norwegian official discourse 2012–2016. Mentions per 
100,000 words (and appearance in % of documents, and total number of mentions) per year.
Julie Wilhelmsen & Kristian L. Gjerde
386
ministries. On the Norwegian side, the most striking trend is that, from 2014, the 
MoD mentions Russia far more frequently. For the MFA, the extent—if not content— 
of attention has been fairly stable. On the Russian side, two trends in the press docu-
ments from the Russian Ministry of Defense stand out: the frequency of mentions of 
Norway drops drastically from 2014, a direct result of Norway suspending military 
cooperation and joint exercises with Russia; and the frequency of references to the 
Arctic increases significantly.14
To trace the development of the policy modes at play in the Arctic, we examine 
the content of this attention in depth. Through discourse analysis, we uncover how 
the “Arctic” is represented in these texts; how each state represents its own role, 
interests, and intentions in the region, as well as how the role, interests, and inten-
tions of the other are represented. In line with the meta-theoretical foundation of 
discourse analysis, our analysis does not allow us to draw conclusions as to what the 
true “intention” of these states might be.15 We take the written and spoken words 
of official representatives at face value and establish the representations of Self and 
Other. Special attention is paid to how these narratives on relations in the Arctic shift 
over time and across issue areas. This makes it possible to establish the policy modes 
of the two states 2012–2016, and the prospects for New Cold War contamination. 
We begin by drawing a rough picture of the changing modes of Norwegian–Russian 
interaction in the period prior to the years in focus here. 
Figure 2. “The Arctic” and “Norway” in Russian official discourse 2012–2016. Mentions per 
100,000 words (and appearance in % of documents, and total number of mentions) per year.
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3. Norway and Russia in the Arctic: historical mix of modes
Even during the Cold War, various modes were at play in the Arctic, although security 
concerns were central.16 Norway pursued deterrence through NATO membership 
and limited cross-border collaboration in the North. These policies, which can be 
seen as being pursued in a realist mode, given the primacy afforded to security inter-
ests and power projection, were paralleled on the Russian side.17 Still, the priority 
given to security issues on both sides was complemented by policy initiatives aimed 
at reducing tension and balancing between security and other issue areas, indicating 
that policies were pursued also in a diplomatic management mode. On the Norwegian 
side, deterrence policies were matched by policies of reassurance. Norway’s “self- 
imposed restraints” were aimed at alleviating Soviet concerns of Western aggres-
sion.18 In addition to regular diplomatic contacts, Norway and the USSR sought to 
develop bilateral management measures for the fish resources in the Barents Sea.19 
Also the lengthy negotiations over the delimitation line in the Barents Sea starting in 
the early 1970s can be seen as part of a diplomatic management mode of policy, as 
they prevented the issue from being securitized in the public debate and located it 
outside the orbit of East–West confrontation. 
With the end of the Cold War, Norway sought to strengthen the multilateral 
institutional structures in the North, including international legal regimes, and to 
promote interaction with Russia in these committing and potentially transforming 
institutional structures. A major Norwegian effort was the initiation of the Barents 
Euro-Arctic Council in 1993. Work focused on toning down the importance of secu-
rity issues, alleviating military tensions, and enhancing trust and prosperity through 
cross-border activity in the economic, cultural, environmental, health, and educa-
tional spheres.20
However, to say that Cold War realist thinking was replaced by post-Cold War 
institutionalism would be an oversimplification—of both eras. For example, although 
Norwegian policies were redirected away from deterrence, and other policy fields 
than security were allowed to dominate, Norway’s rejection of Russia’s suggestion in 
the early 1990s to incorporate security into the Barents Cooperation constituted a 
silent but significant continuation of security-oriented, realist thinking. Tweaking the 
self-imposed restrictions from the Cold War era, Norway also encouraged increased 
allied presence in the North and sought to attract continued strategic attention to the 
region.21 And while Russia did take part in this new institutionalism, to some extent 
Moscow saw the institutions Norway initiated in this period as skewed—not neutral 
international institutions, but tools in a realist-oriented policy of power projection.22
In general, however, Moscow neglected the Arctic region in the 1990s. This 
changed after the turn of the millennium, due to rising Russian capacities, the 
re-emergence of the Northern Sea Route, the possibility of extracting Arctic oil and 
gas,23 and the “impending division of the Arctic continental shelf,” to be conducted 
in accordance with the UN Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS).24 The 
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economic prospects these developments offered, as well as the general focus on 
Russian reform through integration with Western economies and global institutions, 
inclined Russia’s approach to Norway in the North more toward the institutional 
and diplomatic management modes—evident, for example, in Russian policies on 
Svalbard.25 
This Russian approach corresponded with a renewed Norwegian emphasis on 
institutionalism from 2005 onwards. The new Labor–Center–Socialist coalition 
made the “High North” a national priority; collaboration and partnership with 
Russia became crucial.26 The new High North initiative stressed the spheres of 
science and business, and welcomed the prospects for Norwegian participation in 
developing the Shtokman gas field. It also involved the continuation of collaborative 
efforts across issue areas like the environment, climate, nuclear security, fisheries, 
and people-to-people contact. In addition, Norway sought to enhance multilateral 
institutional cooperation through engagement in the Arctic Council and in global 
issues like climate and indigenous rights.27 
The landmark 2010 Norwegian/Russian agreement on the delimitation line in the 
Barents Sea, dividing the contested area evenly in two, can be seen as the fruit of 
a culture of compromise logically emerging from state interaction imprinted by an 
institutionalist mode of policy.28 Arguably, such a culture could thrive because the 
region was not made an arena for security-oriented big-power politics and zero-sum 
thinking.
The predominance of a culture of compromise at this point does not mean that 
other modes were not present, however. Leif C. Jensen, for example, argues that 
Norwegian politicization of energy issues made the energy game into “high politics” 
and contributed to the rebirth of realism and state-centrism in the region.29 In the 
years prior to the start of our case study there were also Norwegian efforts to bring 
NATO “back home” to prioritize the territorial defense of member states, efforts 
that contributed to the renewed emphasis on territorial defense in NATO’s 2010 
Strategic Concept.30 
On the Russian side, reactions to the 2010 delimitation agreement were split, 
showing different views of “Norway” and “Russia” in the Arctic and the type of 
approach to be pursued. As noted by Geir Hønneland, there were two camps here: 
what we can call a “bad agreement camp,” which felt that Russian territories and 
interests had been sacrificed and saw the treaty as an expression of Russian weakness 
in the face of Western countries conspiring against Russia; and what we can call a 
“good agreement camp”, which saw the treaty as an expression of and a contribution 
to good-neighborly cooperation, and dismissed the idea that Norway intended to 
trick or fool anyone.31 Another conceptualization of Russian approaches to the Arc-
tic in general is offered by Marlene Laruelle, who identifies two Russian Arctic strat-
egies: “security first” and “cooperation first.”32 Although Hønneland’s and Laruelle’s 
categories do not fully overlap, the “security first” and the “bad agreement” readings 
share a realist reading of international politics, whereas the “cooperation first” and 
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“good agreement” readings have more in common with a “liberalist institutionalist” 
outlook. 
The key point here is that Russia has approached the Arctic and relations with 
Norway in various ways across different issues, changing over time. Also on the Nor-
wegian side, approaches to Russia have been more mixed than is often recognized. 
This provides our point of entry for the case-study below: it is not the policies of 
one state alone that determine what kind of relations will dominate in the Arctic. 
Cooperative or conflictual relations, understood more as a scale than a dichotomy, 
emerge through the combination of changing foreign policies and how these policies 
are perceived by the other side.
4. How Norway views Russia in the High North
4.1. From key partner in the land of opportunity to potential challenge, 2012–2013
Our review of official texts from 2012 shows representations of the Arctic/High 
North as a land of opportunity and collaboration. “Energy-enthusiasm,” “sustain-
ability,” “knowledge,” “international law,” “peace,” “development,” “technology,” 
“engagement,” “increasing activity,” “global interaction,” “institutions,” “collabora-
tion in military sphere,” and “success” are repeated words. In this space of positive 
dynamics, the Russian Other features as a key partner in positive terms, and as an 
actor who respects the law.33 Norwegian–Russian relations had “never been better 
than now.”34 Even in policy areas where Russia is represented as a “challenge,” col-
laboration is to be the solution.35 Russia’s human rights and democratic credentials 
(or lack thereof) are not emphasized until late 2012/early 2013. Norwegian Foreign 
Minister Jonas Gahr Støre stated explicitly that such credentials could not be used 
to question the legitimacy of Russia as an actor on the international arena. The col-
laborative line would continue, also after the controversial 2011 and 2012 Russian 
elections.36 
The discourse on collaboration and partnership with Russia is pursued together 
with a low-key but continuous emphasis on the need to strengthen territorial defense 
in the North, as well as to draw the attention of NATO and Norway’s closest allies to 
the region. The main priority for Norwegian defense in this period is to “constitute 
a war-preventive threshold on the basis of NATO membership.”37 However, reflect-
ing the primacy of the institutionalist mode in Norwegian policies toward Russia in 
the North, these security policy considerations are never explicitly linked to Russia, 
not even in MoD speeches; in official discourse more generally, the North remains 
a special space regulated by law and peaceful collaboration. When heightened 
Russian military activity in the North is mentioned, this is represented as a “legiti-
mate” return to the “normal.”38 During a visit by Russian Deputy Minister of Defense 
Anatolii Antonov, where military collaboration was on the agenda, Norwegian 
officials even suggested, “We will become world champions in defending the High 
North, on both sides of the border.”39 
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Seen from the outside, the mix of the policies of “institutionalized partnership 
with Russia in the North” and a “strong NATO in the North” constitutes a clear 
tension in the Norwegian approach. It is also a mix certain to elicit less cooperative 
policies from the Russian side if the second were accentuated at the expense of the 
first, and Russian views of NATO became more adversarial. Oddly, the idea of “tra-
ditional security policy” or a “stable military presence” in the North as a condition 
for good-neighborly relations is floated in 2012, perhaps in an attempt to bridge the 
two incompatible lines of Norwegian policy in the North.40 And, at least in MoD 
texts, we note rising apprehension of Russia’s growing “big-power ambitions” as 
well as the “modernization” and “buildup” of its military, indicating that Norwegian 
representations and views of the Russian Other are changing in response to Russian 
actions.41
During autumn 2012/spring 2013 we see new apprehensions concerning Russia 
in official Norwegian statements concerning NGOs in Russia and Moscow’s turn 
to “authoritarian” rule.42 Importantly, this new focus on Russia’s human rights and 
democracy credentials seems to tie in with the broader framing of global develop-
ments identifying the “West” and the “Western world order” as being under threat—
with “Norway” as an implicit part of this social entity also being under threat. That 
elicits the expressed need to stand together with “traditional allies” and fight for 
international law, human rights, and democracy worldwide, from the Middle East to 
Russia. On the Norwegian list of institutions for bolstering the “West” in this strug-
gle we find not only the EU, the CoE, and the OSCE, but also NATO.43 In a sense, 
official Norway expands the liberal interventionist agenda in this period. 
With a new government in power from September 2013 and before the crises in 
Ukraine, official Norwegian discourse on the Russian Other shifts further. Together 
with a continued emphasis on collaboration and good-neighborly relations in a High 
North governed by international law and multilateral collaboration, representations 
of Russia as a partner feature less prominently,44 whereas Russia as a human rights 
violator becomes more prominent. The Norwegian side argues that Russia’s new 
NGO law will obstruct people-to-people cooperation in the North. In the first direct 
meetings with Russian officials after the new Oslo government takes office, the rights 
of sexual minorities in Russia are brought up.45 The emphasis on Russia as a human 
rights violator is also evident in meetings between Norwegian officials and indepen-
dent Russian NGOs during official visits to Russia.46 
While this greater emphasis on Russia as human rights violator is voiced mostly by 
the Norwegian MFA and the Prime Minister, also MoD representations construct 
Russia as an opposite to Norway/the West/NATO in terms of values. Further, MoD 
texts now represent Russia as a security-oriented big power in the North. Modern-
ization of the Russian military is no longer associated with “normalization” as in 
2012, but with Russia’s rising big-power ambitions. Norway is held to need new mil-
itary capabilities in the North to defend its sovereignty and protect its interests. Pre-
senting a strong NATO as prerequisite for Norwegian security, the new government 
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also seeks to strengthen transatlantic bonds and reinforce collaboration with NATO. 
These entities are represented as trustworthy, orderly, and reliable, whereas Russia’s 
status is tilting toward threatening. According to MoD texts, greater collaboration is 
needed within the transatlantic community, not necessarily with Russia. The NATO–
Russia Council is seen as the best multilateral forum for relating to Russia. We also 
note the expressed ambition of giving Norway a more central role in NATO and of 
taking the NATO footprint North, through more allied training and exercises as well 
as military capabilities.47 In sum, and building on the changes in Norwegian Self/
Other representations, we find a clear re-orientation toward a realist mode of policy 
already before the annexation of Crimea—in MoD understandings of the High North 
as primarily a security space, as well as in policies aimed at making national security 
a priority in the North.
4.2. A tectonic shift, 2014–2016
These new representations of “Russia,” “Norway,” and relations in the High North 
become amplified following the crises in Ukraine, which official Norwegian dis-
course describes as a tectonic shift in international relations, heading nearly every 
official account of international developments in 2014, 2015 and 2016. According to 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Børge Brende, Russia had “moved into a fundamentally 
new phase in relation to the outside world,” pursuing “power-politics belonging to a 
different age” and “acting in a way nobody had done since the Second World War.”48 
In sum, the Russian Other becomes a rule-breaker, a thief, even a liar, an actor that 
disregards established institutions and cannot be trusted.49 “The High North,” and 
even “the Arctic,” are reframed in Norwegian government discourse with reference 
to Russia’s actions in Ukraine (later also to its actions in Georgia in 2008 and in 
Syria from 2015). The discursive positioning of the High North into the new orbit of 
potential conflict with Russia grows stronger and stronger, at least in MoD texts.50 In 
late 2016, the Minister of Defense states, with clear reference to Russia, “we cannot 
preclude that military force will not be used against Norway… It is no longer so that 
war is declared through diplomatic messengers.”51 
The Arctic is still seen as a space governed by collaboration and international 
law, but Russia is, with reference to its actions in Ukraine, projected as a potential 
rule-breaker. Hence, Norway as a principled actor must hold Russia accountable.52 
The government continues to speak of preserving cooperation, but the North now 
figures increasingly as a military strategic space. Security becomes a key priority 
for Norwegian foreign policy, with special reference to the North: With the new 
challenge from the eastern neighbor, the Norwegian Self figures as a small power in 
need of protection. Good-neighborly relations in the North are now construed as 
the result of Norway being firm, predictable, principled, and adhering to interna-
tional law. By upping the civilian and military presence in the North and anchoring 
Norwegian security more firmly in NATO, Norway can contribute to “stability” and 
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“predictability” in the North.53 It is even indicated that increasing such transatlantic 
presence and making Norway into “NATO in the North” may be required to keep 
tension levels low and preserve the Arctic as a “peaceful region.”54 
As in all securitization processes, calls for unity and protection follow such 
re-phrasing of the Other from partner to threat.55 The Norwegian government’s dis-
course now projects the need to strengthen NATO collaboration and cooperation 
with the USA (implicitly or explicitly given as the guarantor of Norwegian security) 
and Europe. These three entities are represented as being trustworthy and having 
“good values.” Noteworthy is how “the West,” “NATO,” “the USA,” “Europe,” “the 
EU,” “the Nordic countries,” and “Norway” as “friends,” “allies” or “likeminded” 
get merged into one positive social unit/Self—juxtaposed to a Russian Other with 
no positive distinctions. The strength of the transatlantic vector in Norwegian foreign 
policy is now explicitly given as the precondition for good relations with Russia in 
the North—it is no longer an issue of what Russia and Norway can do together.56 
Could the crises in Russian–Western relations be limited to the specific situation in 
Ukraine? Judging from the texts reviewed here, the Norwegian government’s answer 
was no.57 Relations had changed irrevocably: not even a solution to the Ukraine 
crises could alter the new security situation in Europe. The reason was Russia’s use 
of force against another European country, but also its poor democratic and human 
rights credentials. In breaking international law, Russia was undermining the inter-
national order and its entire underlying set of values. Russia is now represented as a 
power inclined to use military means instead of diplomacy, incapable of respecting 
other states’ political goals. “We” had been naïve, failing to understand Russia’s true 
intentions and ambitions. Russia had not become like “us” in terms of values. It was 
“assertive” and “aggressive,” and its military was now highly capable of “rapid,” 
“precise” operations that also Norway had to be prepared for. The modernization 
of Russia’s Northern Fleet is explicitly included in this narrative. The phrase Russia 
“has both the capacity and will to use military power for political gain” recurs, and 
by 2016 also the idea of Russia acquiring a “strategic advantage” in the North. 
Norway is no longer capable of “area denial.” Although Russia is never directly 
named as a “threat” to Norway in official discourse, taken together, the various 
representations constitute Russia as a threat in the North. The proper response is no 
longer “strategic partnership” and “constructive engagement” but “firmness” and 
“deterrence”—and “reassurance” not of Russia, but of the Baltic states and Poland. 
“We” must realize that the deterioration in Russian–Western relations might spill 
over into the North. Standing by our allies and speaking out on negative develop-
ments in Russia becomes essential.58 
Both MoD and MFA texts put the blame for deteriorating relations firmly and 
solely on the Russian side. Russia must “change its ways” first, before any improve-
ment can take place. Here the MoD texts represent Russia as a threat to military 
security, and MFA texts more as a threat to international law—Norway’s “first-line 
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defense.”59 The “liberal interventionist” position, which accords fundamental impor-
tance to the political system of a foreign state in defining how to relate to that state 
and the kind of policies to be pursued toward it, also becomes stronger in MFA 
discourse in this period.60 
This new interpretation of Russia and relations with Russia in the North indicates 
that Norwegian polices on Russia have changed substantially since 2014, making it 
reasonable to label the mode of Norwegian policies on Russia as primarily realist. 
Norway immediately and unconditionally joined the EU sanctions regime on Russia 
in 2014. The policy initiatives taken in recent years, made acceptable by the changes 
in official representations of the Russian Other, have largely abandoned the Cold 
War practice of “balancing” between deterrence and reassurance: since 2017, 330 
US Marines have been stationed at Værnes/Trondheim in mid-Norway, initially on 
a rotational basis but now apparently de facto permanently.61 The Norwegian MoD 
has also been lobbying for the establishment of a new maritime command in the 
North and has proposed a Norwegian contribution to the European missile shield, 
with reference to the “Russian threat.”62 This has been accompanied by a significant 
decline in diplomatic contacts. Between 2014 and mid-2016 not one Norwegian 
minister visited Russia. In June 2016, the Minister of Fisheries went to St Petersburg. 
Not until March 2017 did the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs travel to 
Russia, to attend the conference “Arctic—Territory of Dialogue” in Arkhangelsk. 
Norwegian ministers would go to Kiev, London or various NATO capitals instead, 
to discuss greater collaboration, often in the military-strategic sphere and in the 
High North.63
4.3. Return of dialogue and conditional collaboration? 
Historical discourses and representations have staying power, however. It took less 
than half a year following the annexation of Crimea before the Russian Other was 
again referred to as a “constructive” and “reliable partner in the North” and policies 
of “dialogue” were prescribed to balance the policies of deterrence—but these words 
were not often repeated, the two first (“constructive” and “reliable”) occurring only 
once in the reviewed texts.64 “Dialogue” appears several times in MoD texts, but 
more as a reluctant caveat to the heavy and repeated accent on “deterrence.”65 
In MFA texts, “dialogue” with Russia on Arctic issues reappears only well into 
2016.66 The High North returns as the land of opportunity, at least for Norway 
and as regards energy, natural resources, and tourism.67 The “Arctic”/“High North” 
is now given as Norway’s key foreign policy interest-area, often represented as a 
“peaceful and stable region” with reference to “all the states” respecting the Law 
of the Seas.68 It is also acknowledged that the North is of strategic importance for 
Russia, even that Norway needs “to understand Russia’s interests and goals.”69 
The idea of collaboration with Russia in the North on common interests gradually 
returns in MoD, MFA as well as Prime Minister texts. However, the emphasis is on 
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cooperation when that is in Norway’s “interest;” asserting Norwegian sovereignty 
stands as a key aim in Norwegian policies.70 
There is emphasis on upholding Norwegian–Russian cooperation to the extent 
possible in the traditional spheres of fisheries, nuclear safety, environment and nat-
ural resource management, search and rescue in the Barents Sea, people-to-people 
collaboration, the Barents Council and Secretariat, and the Arctic Council, at least 
when addressing audiences in Northern Norway.71 This type of collaboration with 
Russia is construed as being in Norway’s national interest. However, it needs to be 
matched by increased military presence in the North at sea, as well as in stronger 
surveillance capabilities.72 
In the texts studied here, the Oslo government did not securitize the stream of 
refugees entering Norway from Russia over Storskog in Finnmark county in the 
fall of 2015 as part of the “Russian threat” or as “hybrid warfare,” although that 
image featured strongly in the wider public debate.73 The swift solution was framed 
in official discourse as part of the traditional good-neighborly relations and extensive 
experience of collaboration between Norway and Russia.74 
By late 2016, the term “reassurance” (with reference to Russia, not to NATO 
allies) re-appears in official strategic vocabulary as a necessary complement to 
“deterrence.”75 However, it now seems more of a claim employed to create rhetor-
ical continuity between current Norwegian policies and the policies of “balancing” 
during the Cold War. Moreover, the emerging official talk about “reassurance” came 
in response to criticism of Norwegian government policies voiced in the domestic 
debate.76
Nevertheless, Norwegian policies came to reflect this mix of realist and institution-
alist understandings. While funding for the Barents Secretariat and cultural collab-
oration in the North increased, and cooperation in the fields of “people-to-people,” 
search and rescue, coast and border guards, nuclear safety, etc. continued,77 the 
policy implementation of “dialogue” in Norwegian initiatives and activities seems to 
amount to supporting “dialogue” in the NATO–Russia Council.78 That reflects the 
low weight accorded to such policies in official statements.
In this period, Norwegian official discourse on “Russia,” “Norway,” and “the 
West” (in all its incarnations)—and on the relations between these social entities—in 
the High North shifts toward a juxtaposition of threat/protection, bad/good, etc. 
Realist and security-oriented policies become logical, and collaborative policies in 
line with an institutionalist mode less so.
5. How Russia views Norway and the Arctic
Not surprisingly, Norway occupies a lesser place in the Russian official discourse 
than the other way around. Due to the paucity of documents focusing on Norway, 
here we examine the Russian discourse explicitly on Norway and on interaction in 
the Arctic more broadly.
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5.1. Russia on the Arctic 2012–2016: harmony threatened by NATO?
In general, in official Russian discourse in 2012–2016 we note an emphasis on the 
Arctic as an area of opportunity for Russia—and as a region characterized by suc-
cessful international cooperation. The Arctic is an example for other, less peaceful 
regions.79 Also after 2014, the picture is of continuing Arctic cooperation despite 
the overall worsening of international relations.80 Russia maintains the need to avoid 
militarization of the Arctic, stressing that there are no military solutions to the chal-
lenges facing the Arctic.
In Moscow’s view, the clearest threat to the current state of affairs in the Arctic 
region is a military approach of Western countries—especially attempts to get NATO 
involved in the Arctic. Back in 2012, Lavrov warned:
[In the Arctic], the situation is not that complicated when it comes to military blocs, 
which are not there, although some of our partners are persistently trying to call for 
NATO to come there. We oppose this. We believe that such a step will be a very bad 
signal to militarize the Arctic, even if it is the case that NATO simply wants to come 
there and get comfortable. Militarization of the Arctic should be avoided by all possible 
means.81
While we have seen above that Norway presents the stability and peacefulness of the 
Arctic region as well as good-neighborly relations with Russia as depending on NATO 
engagement in the region, Russia holds a diametrically opposed view.82 And while 
Norway consistently presents its positions as a logical answer to Russia’s changing 
behavior, Russia likewise presents its actions as reactive, and is irritated at what it 
sees as hypocritical expectations:83 
Patrolling of remote areas with strategic airplanes used to be carried out by two parties 
only: the Soviet Union and the United States—that was back in Cold War times. In the 
early 1990s, we, the new, modern Russia, stopped these flights, while our American 
friends just continued to fly along our borders. For what? Some years ago we also 
resumed these flights. And you want to say that we behaved aggressively? (…) American 
submarines are on permanent duty by the Norwegian coasts, and their missiles can reach 
Moscow in 17 minutes. While we removed our bases from Cuba a long time ago, even 
those with no strategic significance. And you want to say that we behave aggressively? 
(…) Everything we do is simply a response to threats emerging against us. Moreover, 
we do this in a perfectly limited volume and scale, but sufficient to guarantee Russia’s 
security. Or did someone expect us to disarm unilaterally?84
Russia itself does not hide its markedly increased military attention toward the Arc-
tic, as indicated in Figure 2 above. In the Western press, Russian activity is often 
framed as part of an offensive strategy, and evidence of Russian militarization of the 
Arctic.85 In the official Russian discourse, however, these efforts do not constitute 
militarization: they are represented as purely defensive, aimed largely at address-
ing domestic concerns (e.g., environmental protection); rather than constituting a 
threat, they are framed as being about establishing good governance domestically in 
the Russian Arctic.86
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Some, like Rosneft CEO Igor Sechin, stress that the “competition for resources in 
the Arctic is getting tougher,” between Arctic and non-Arctic actors.87 Yet, in general, 
the emphasis remains on Russian efforts in the Arctic as being natural and necessary 
in order for Russia to be a responsible Arctic actor, managing resources, upholding 
sovereignty and being prepared for any threats that may arise. The expansion of 
military infrastructure and activity is represented as “restrained and reasonable in 
scale (…) simply in keeping with what Russia unquestionably needs to do to ensure 
its defense capability,”88 and as necessary after decades of neglect, not least in light 
of increased interest and better access to the Northern Sea Route and the Northern 
shores.89 As Putin stated in August 2014:
This is our territory, and we will restore all this military infrastructure and the 
infrastructure of the Ministry of Emergency Situations, in parts also because we need 
to ensure the safe passing of convoys and trade routes, and not in order to fight or 
confront anyone. (…) Many perceive our activity with concern, and are frightened by 
this activity. We have already said many times that we will act exclusively in accordance 
with international law. That is how we always have acted and how we will act in the 
future. [In the Arctic] many other states have their interests. We will take these interests 
into account and work to achieve acceptable compromises—and at the same time of 
course assert our own interests.90
In many ways, Russian efforts in the Arctic are represented as a return to the 
normal—a representation maintained also by the Norwegian side early in the period 
under study: Russia wants to utilize its proud Arctic history in today’s changing nat-
ural and political setting.
5.2. Norway seen from Moscow: increasingly “NATO in the North”?
Russian officials elaborate on relations with Norway especially in the context of min-
isterial visits, but also in commenting on specific events and answering questions 
from the press. In this explicit, official Russian discourse on Norway, we find several 
distinct representations of Norway, fairly stable, but with a shift in emphasis since 
2014: Norway is increasingly seen as the prolonged arm of NATO and the USA—a 
significant point, given the representation of NATO as a threat.
Initially, Norway appears mainly as a good neighbor, in bilateral relations and 
through multilateral institutions like the Arctic Council, the Northern Dimension, 
and the Barents Euro-Arctic Council.91 Norway is often mentioned in the energy 
context, with Statoil as a promising corporate partner for Russian companies and 
an example of a successful state corporation. Norway gets recognition for its con-
tribution to cooperative efforts aimed at removing chemical weapons from Syria. In 
particular, the 2010 maritime delimitation agreement between Russia and Norway is 
hailed as a key achievement under the Medvedev presidency,92 and is later defended 
against internal Russian accusations that the treaty was a “gift” from Russia to 
Norway—the treaty is presented as “just and in accordance with international law,” 
and “advantageous to both states.”93
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Prior to Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs Brende’s visit to Moscow in 
January 2014, his Russian counterpart Lavrov had a clear and positive message:
The relations between Russia and Norway are developing dynamically and with good 
results within all the important directions. The dialogue at the level of the states’ 
leadership is deepening: last year there were two meetings between the prime ministers—
April 5 in St Petersburg and June 4 in Kirkenes. The perspectives for organizing new 
contacts are being discussed.94
During the visit itself, Lavrov dismissed insinuations from the press that rising 
Russian–Western tensions had negative impacts on Russian–Norwegian relations.95 
However, he would soon start answering such questions differently.
Representations of Norway as a “good neighbor” are increasingly complemented 
by representations of Norway as a country that consciously chooses to be a less good 
neighbor. Catering to its Western partners, Norway is seen as acting against both 
Russia’s and Norway’s own interests.
In October 2014, Lavrov visited the border town of Kirkenes on the occasion 
of the 70th anniversary of the Soviet liberation of Northern Norway in World War 
II. Amid praise of the veterans, Norway’s honoring of the wartime history, and the 
shared “joint combat brotherhood” that “substantially strengthened the fundament 
for good-neighborliness and friendly relations,” Lavrov also commented on the cur-
rent state of affairs in bilateral relations:
Today these relations are of course experiencing a certain tension in connection with 
Norway’s joining of the unilateral restrictive measures against Russia for reasons, as we 
understand it, lie outside of the country. (…) We hope that common sense and each 
country’s national interests—and not external pressure—in the end will prevail.96
Lavrov notes how Russia’s and Norway’s joint interests are threatened by “various 
directions of the bilateral cooperation being subject to artificial restrictions, based on 
Euro-Atlantic solidarity and with reference to the Ukrainian crisis.”97 Here Norway 
is presented as part of a Euro-Atlantic social entity seen as hostile toward Russia. 
This identification has also framed events on Svalbard. In Russian–Norwegian 
relations, disagreements on the Norwegian management of Svalbard have a long 
history. In the period under study, one episode is particularly instructive—one that 
also taps into the discontent expressed by Lavrov.
On April 18, 2015, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitrii Rogozin paid a brief 
visit to Svalbard as his plane made a layover before he headed further north into 
the Arctic. In 2014 Rogozin had been added to the EU/Norwegian sanctions list 
and banned from entering Norway. The Norwegian authorities reacted negatively 
to what they saw as a Russian provocation and breach of Norwegian sovereignty. 
In turn, their Russian counterparts accused Norway of not respecting the Svalbard 
Treaty of 1920, which allows access to Svalbard for all citizens of the signatory 
states,98 and regretted this “unfriendly step” from the Norwegian side.99 The Russian 
MFA saw this not as an isolated incident, and expressed doubt over Norwegian 
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willingness to continue “the spirit of partnership in the Arctic that Norway until 
now always has shown.” In the same statement, it acknowledged problems in the 
bilateral relationship: “We regret Norway’s initiative to join the EU’s anti-Russian 
sanctions, which will have negative consequences for Russian–Norwegian relations 
and, we believe, leads to our Norwegian neighbors having a distorted perception of 
reality.”100 Again, Norway’s acting in concert with its Western partners is presented 
as harming good-neighborly relations.
One distinct and important representation of Norway could be seen as the logical 
extreme of Russian concerns about Norway’s Russia policy being dictated by its 
allies. This representation places Norway as part of the US military system, and that 
system as an offensive force directed against Russia. Addressing the Seliger Youth 
Camp in August 2014, Putin stated:
The Arctic plays a very important role for us when it comes to safeguarding our security, 
because—unfortunately—it is the case that US attack submarines are concentrated 
there, not far from the Norwegian coast, and I remind you that the missiles they carry 
would reach Moscow within 15–16 minutes.101
It is in this narrative that Norway’s decision to invite 330 US Marines to be based 
near Trondheim on a “rotational” basis is placed. As explained by the Russian MFA 
spokesperson Mariya Zakharova:
Obviously, we have taken note of this fact. We believe that it contradicts the Norwegian 
policy of not allowing foreign military bases in the country in peacetime. (…) This 
decision by the Norwegian government appears to be yet another link in a chain of US-
led military preparations that have markedly intensified lately against the backdrop of 
the anti-Russian hysteria. This step clearly does not contribute to maintaining stability 
and security in the North of Europe.102
Also in other fields of the bilateral relationship, Norway is represented as essentially 
obeying orders from Washington, as when the Russian MFA criticized Norway for extra-
diting a Russian citizen to the USA at the request of the US Secret Services, arguably 
at the expense of respect for international law—a “politicized” approach that Russia 
would “take into account in the further development of relations with Norway.”103
Russian representations of Norway change during the period under study, effec-
tively merging Norway into NATO/the USA, a social entity long construed as the 
threatening Other. Representations of Russia that appear through the texts also 
evolve, although more in degree than as a qualitative change: the representations of 
Russia as a responsible international actor promoting predictable relations between 
equal partners stand out even more clearly as Norway is increasingly presented as 
working against these ideals to the benefit of NATO.
In line with the changing Russian representations of the Arctic and the key actors 
in this region, we observe changes in Russian military policies. Examples include 
the establishment of the Joint Strategic Command North in 2014 and the creation 
in early 2015 of the 80th Arctic Brigade, both ahead of schedule.104 We also note the 
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increase in Russian snap military drills in the Arctic and in naval and air patrols near 
Norwegian territory, as well as enhanced submarine training in Arctic waters.105 All 
these changes are presented as responses to NATO activity in the North. Overall, it 
is reasonable to label the mode of Russian policies in the Arctic as increasingly realist.
In sum, then, Russia’s developing mode in relation to Norway in the Arctic 2012–
2016 shows an unmistakable drift—from an institutionalist mode based on the 
perception that both states benefit from pursuing their own interests in a predict-
able manner, to a more realist mode. Seen from Moscow, this drift is due to policy 
changes on the Norwegian side—in particular, Norway’s acting in concert with its 
Western partners.106 As a result, security concerns may seem to crowd out other 
aspirations in relation to Norway.
6. Conclusions
We began by asking whether the strained and conflict-prone relations between Russia 
and the West following the crisis in Ukraine have metastasized to the Arctic, shaping and 
changing interaction between two previously close partners in the North, Norway 
and Russia. Our answer is yes. Despite the cautious return of the discourse on dialogue 
and good-neighborly relations on the Norwegian side, and Russia’s insistence that it wants 
relations in the Arctic to develop along a peaceful, cooperative trajectory, these coun-
tries’ representations of each other since 2014 have paved the way for realist mode poli- 
cies on both sides, moving them into a more conflictual, security-oriented relationship.
The parallel trajectories are as follows: On the Norwegian side, representations of 
the Arctic as the land of opportunity and collaboration and Russia as a trustworthy 
partner conditioned the continuation of the institutionalist mode of policies up to mid-
2013. There was a parallel push to increase strategic capabilities and NATO attention 
to the North, but not legitimized with reference to Russia as a “threat.” Belligerent 
representations of Russia in Norwegian official discourse first emerge with reference 
to Russia posing a threat to liberal and democratic values. These are then coupled with 
new projections of Russia’s military modernization in the Arctic as a possibly danger-
ous sign of rising big-power ambitions from the summer of 2013, that is, before the 
crises in Ukraine. Representations then shift dramatically, with Russia being consti-
tuted as a threat and Norway as a vulnerable entity in need of allies and protection.107 
Crucially, Norwegian policies seem to have downgraded their Cold War aspect of “bal-
ancing.” Diplomatic contact and initiatives on the top political level as well as clear 
restrictions on foreign military bases and exercises in Norway—all policies that could 
reassure Russia that Norway would not be used as a US/NATO military launchpad 
against Russia—are scarce indeed. In the mix of modes on the Norwegian side, diplo-
matic management loses ground, given the new weight accorded to security concerns 
and the distribution of military power in the first years after 2014.
On the Russian side, representations of Norway as a good, predictable neigh-
bor wishing to develop relations with Russia on an equal footing to the benefit of 
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both states have been accompanied by representations of a different Norway. This 
Norway, presented as the result of deliberate Norwegian policy choices, acts as the 
representative of NATO and the USA in the region. Indeed: Norway is NATO in 
the region. In a Russian context where NATO and US military presence are seen as 
major threats to continued peaceful development in the Arctic region, this shift in 
representations is of great consequence. We can say that Russia’s previous inclination 
to pursue policies in an institutionalist mode has been tilting toward policies reflect-
ing a realist mode, expressed not only through increasing military activity but also 
through the denial of entry to Russia—on grounds of national security—for several 
Norwegian journalists, businessmen and activists in the border region.108 
How did these shifts come about? Above we have stressed the interaction effects 
involved in such shifting Norwegian and Russian representations and approaches 
in the Arctic. The starting point for both states was that, despite the overall wors-
ening of Russian–Western relations, the Arctic should be protected as a space for 
peaceful interaction. If we take the wording of official statements at face value, the 
deterioration has been driven by the interpretation of what the other party is, does, 
and wants to achieve in the Arctic. Both parties then legitimize their own shift to a 
more one-sidedly realist mode of policy with reference to moves made by the other 
side. While Moscow indirectly identifies Norway as part of “US militarization” and 
highlights NATO’s increasing attempts to get involved in the Arctic already in 2012, 
Oslo re-emphasizes Russia as a threat to liberal values from late 2012 onward, and, 
in its continuing efforts to bring NATO to the North, implicitly as a potential security 
threat. Given these brewing suspicions on both sides before 2014 it is not surprising 
that a negative pattern of interaction should ensue. From this, we can outline three 
broad points about how interaction works and how the fault lines over Ukraine have 
been exported to the Arctic. 
First, the policies pursued by one state are affected by the actions of the other 
party. As seen from Norway, Moscow’s actions in Ukraine played into representa-
tions of Russia as a potential threat, making the establishment of a stronger NATO 
footprint in the North appear a logical policy priority. In turn, such moves on 
the Norwegian side played into Russia’s already clearly articulated fears of such 
a footprint, spurring Moscow to step up what are presented as defensive military 
activities in the Arctic. Pointing out this negative spiral effect is almost banal from 
an analytical perspective, but it is politically controversial in the current public 
debate on Russia in Norway, as it is frequently mistaken as an attempt to appor-
tion guilt among the parties. Our point here is to highlight that how Western states 
relate to Russia matters, and vice versa. With the current official representations of 
each other as potential threats in the Arctic, moves to strengthen one side’s defense 
will appear offensive from the other side, pushing the spiral upward, and drawing 
attention to security issues at the expense of other issue areas.
Second, when two parties view and represent each other as hostile and threatening 
in one theatre (say, Ukraine), this representation will not be isolated from how they 
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view each other and relate to each other in other theatres (say, the Arctic). Reviewing 
the changing pattern of Norwegian official discourse as a whole, we find that Russian 
actions in Ukraine are given as a fundamental historical turning-point. Nearly every 
speech is introduced with reference to these actions—and such framing cannot fail 
to affect how Norway views Russia in the North. Representations of Russia as an 
actor in Ukraine were quickly echoed in representations of Russia as an actor in the 
Arctic. There has been a massive interaction effect from Russian actions in Ukraine 
to Norwegian framings and policies on Russia in the North. Here the parallel on 
the Russian side is how Norway’s rapid and unconditional accession to the Western 
sanctions regime affected Russia’s framing of Norway in the North. There is also a 
very practical link between theatres. The rapid movement of Russia’s armed forces 
in Ukraine immediately affected Norwegian military planning, as Norway decided it 
was essential to be capable of rapid response in the North.109
Third, when two parties increasingly view each other as threatening, new and 
sometimes unrelated events may get framed as springing from the general hostility 
of the other, as part of the same chain of hostile actions. Initially, Norway stated that 
Russia was not a direct threat; it also noted that there was no increase in Russian 
military activity in the North. But then a connection was made between heightened 
Russian military activity in the Baltic Sea and Russian military modernization in 
the Arctic—and the latter no longer looked like “normalization.”110 Similarly, in the 
Russian view, sanctions, large-scale military exercises in the North, and US Marines 
at Værnes are all interlinked. The exact size of the forces at Værnes is less important 
here—these events are seen as connected to a hostile US agenda directed against 
Russia, and include militarizing the Arctic.
Of course, politics in the Arctic are not driven solely by these two countries, or 
only by the top political leadership. Also within official Russian–Norwegian relations 
we have found potential for a return to views of Self and Other that could make poli- 
cies of collaboration, or at least tighter diplomatic contact, logical and reasonable 
once again. However, with the (re)turn to the Russian image of Norway as NATO 
in the North, and the Norwegian image of Russia as a power willing and able to use 
force, the Arctic appears less likely as a collaborative space for the coming years. Tell-
ingly, Norway’s announcement on June 12, 2018 that it would increase the number 
of US marines in Norway from 330 to 700, stationing half of them further north 
in Indre Troms, was followed the next day by the Russian announcement of yet 
another snap military exercise involving 36 Russian warships close to the Norwegian 
border—with both Norway and Russia likely to interpret their counterpart’s actions 
as further confirming the necessity of their own change of policy modes.111
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